The article says, "unverified apps will only be easily installable in the sanctioned countries where verification doesn’t exist."
So even if you used a VPN to trick Google into thinking you live in a sanctioned country, you wouldn't be able to distribute apps to those countries without breaking sanctions.
it'd be like saying we should disarm Ukraine, 'cause then Russia doesn't have a reason to invade them
Putin's All-Russia People's Front's policies toward Ukraine have many similarities to Netanyahu's Likud party's policies toward Gaza. Both sets of policies are tragic, causing many innocent people's deaths.
Nevertheless, Ukraine and Gaza are different enough for one to reasonably reach different conclusions about how best peace can be achieved in each place:
Ukraine's weapons are protecting Ukraine against Russian attacks and invasion attempts. Therefore, it is in Ukraine's interests to have them. Hamas's weapons are not protecting Gaza against Israeli attacks or invasion. There is no obvious benefit from Hamas having them.
Servant of the People, and Ukraine, do recognise Russia, and have not seriously proposed eliminating it. Hamas does not officially recognise Israel, and has seriously proposed eliminating it.
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, the UK, the USA, the EU, and the Organization of American States, all designate Hamas a terrorist organisation. This reduces the aid Gaza receives. They seem unlikely to reverse the designation unless Hamas disarms. None of them designate Servant of the People, or Ukraine, a terrorist organisation.
Those points lead me to believe Hamas should disarm.
I also believe countries giving aid to Israel should make it formally contingent on Israel withdrawing from Gaza and the West Bank, to pre-1967 borders, and recognising Palestinian statehood. However, it looks like the US is going to stop aid to Israel regardless.
Trust isn't really the point. Everyone knows Israel and Hamas don't trust each other. I'm more concerned with whether the violent conflict can be reduced, and a stable peace achieved.
Are Hamas's arms doing Gaza any favours? Not that I can see.
AFAICT, if Hamas disarmed:
Israel's only(?) excuse for mass military action in Gaza would disappear.
International support (already shaky) for Israeli military presence in Gaza would decrease.
One or more of Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, the United States, or the European Union might end their designation of Hamas as a terrorist organisation, which could in turn increase the aid and other international support available to Gaza.
i believe a much better secure layer is something similar to what Novacustoms, Purism attempt to do: verify if somebody else not you try to access the laptop.
You're thinking of Heads, which I agree is ideal for supported motherboards.
Home server containing family files: scans, photos, device backups, ...
Office server containing business files: sensitive documents, device backups, ...
Web or email server containing websites, Fediverse instances, emails, etc
In all those cases, full disk encryption (FDE) is a sensible precaution to protect the data in case the server is physically stolen.
Linux is probably the most common OS kernel for self-hosting. On Linux, LUKS (Linux Unified Key Setup) is probably the best FDE system. It's mature and reliable. But anyone self-hosting a Linux server with LUKS FDE is faced with the question of where to store the keys.
Hardware security tokens (HSTs) are widely considered a safer place for keys than SSDs, HDDs, or USB storage. They follow the smartcard principle: a private key can be written to an HST but not read from it (security vulnerabilities excepted). Instead, they implement cryptographic algorithms to prove possession of the private key. So, anyone self-hosting a Linux server with LUKS FDE should strongly consider storing their private key(s) on an HST.
However, there is more than one way to do that. Hence the question in my OP.
It would be trivially detected by widely distributed standard forensic software including the non-Premium variant of Cellebrite able to run on a laptop.
By "duress profile", I mean that if user has enabled a "duress profile" feature in Settings, then entering the duress PIN would:
Erase (the encryption key for) all profiles and storage outside the duress profile; then
Unlock the duress profile.
So, how would forensic software detect that the unlocked profile is a duress profile?
Relevant David Revoy cartoon: https://thebrainbin.org/m/comicstrips@lemmy.world/t/1848750/authenticity-problem